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ANALOGUE IN A DIGITAL AGE? Welsh Labour’s Organisation in post-Devolved 
Wales, 1999-2009 




If we were to look at the political equivalent of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Welsh 
section for most of the last century would in all probability read “For Wales see Labour,” 
with Labour’s successes in Wales so long lasting and comprehensive that, “it was 
possible to confuse Welsh politics with the politics of the Labour Party in Wales.”1  
Labour Party management issues were, for example, considered to be of far more 
consequence to modelling the Welsh devolution settlement, than the influence of 
external actors, both in 1998 and 2006,2 the latter resulting in the creation of the 
infamously byzantine legislative system of legislative competence orders (LCOs) and 
Measures as a party compromise.3 With all the critical debates on devolution held 
within the Welsh Labour Party, it is little wonder that Wyn Jones has described the 
constitutional architecture of Welsh Devolution as a testament to the dominance of 




1 Morgan, K. and G. Mungham. (2000). Redesigning Democracy: The Making of the Welsh Assembly, Seren: 
Bridgend, p.69 
2 Wyn Jones, R. and R. Scully. (2008b). Welsh Devolution: The End of the Beginning or the Beginning of ...?, 
in, Alan Trench ed., The State of the Nations 2008, Imprint Academic: Exeter,  p.68; Morgan and Mungham 
2000, p. 36 
3 Wyn Jones and Scully 2008b, p.64 




Hegemony, however, has not been without cost. The political scientist, Ian McAllister 
writing in 1980 argued that hegemony has had stark organisational consequences for 
the Labour Party in Wales.5  His argument is quite simple: electoral dominance removes 
the necessary ‘profit motive’ as it were, for parties to maintain an effective organisation. 
After all why bother when success/failure is guaranteed for the hegemonic party and 
opposition respectively.6   
 
Applying this theory to Wales, McAllister argued that Welsh Labour possessed a weak 
and dwindling organisation, with success walking hand in hand with an ever decreasing 
and less participatory membership.7 As McAllister says, “any party achieving consistent 
electoral success, seemingly without having to mobilise a large electoral machine, will 
have difficulty in recruiting new members or sustaining any political interest among 
existing members.”8  Welsh Labour’s electoral monopoly has, therefore, reduced the 
incentives for people to join or members to participate and resulted in a hollowed out 
organisation.9 
 
However, this is not the end of the story. A consequence of this internal organisational 
malaise was a reliance on external assistance-namely the trade unions for much of 
Welsh Labour’s history.10 As McAllister documents, there has been a strong dependency 
culture with Welsh Labour dependent on the Unions for assistance financially, 
 
5 McAllister, I. (1980). The Labour Party in Wales: The Dynamics of One-Partyism, Llafur, 3, p. 79 
6 McAllister 1980, p. 79 
7 McAllister 1980, pp.79-81 
8 McAllister 1980, p.81 
9 McAllister 1980, p.81 
10 McAllister 1980, p.82 
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organisationally and in terms of mobilising voters.11  To summarise McAllister’s thesis: 
Welsh Labour’s electoral dominance has resulted in a withered, hollowed out 
organisation which has suffered from declining levels of both membership and member 
participation and is dependent on outside support to operate effectively.12  
 
Welsh Labour post-Devolution: Analogue in a Digital Age 
 
The purpose of this article is to assess Welsh Labour’s organisational adaptation to 
devolution, in doing so it shall argue that a) Welsh Labour organisationally has been 
largely unfit for purpose, and b) such organisational failure was rooted in the party’s 
historic hegemony.  In forwarding this argument, it agrees with McAllister’s thesis and 
argues for the existence of a concept we will call a ‘hegemony hangover,’ a concept that 
essentially refers to the residual effects of hegemony (in Welsh Labour’s case the 
organisational legacy of electoral hegemony) to argue that the successes of the past left 
Welsh Labour under-equipped for devolution. To assess whether Welsh Labour has 
organisationally been fit for purpose, this article uses a checklist made up of 
overlapping intellectual, electoral and organisational challenges that devolution has 
posed in this period.  
 
Firstly, the electoral challenges that devolution has posed Labour. The creation of a 
wholly Welsh electoral and political sphere with devolution has brought with it new 
dynamics, in particular how parties appeal to electors has, for the period 1999-2009 at 
least, been significantly altered. The semi-proportional nature of the additional member 
 
11 McAllister 1980, p.82 
12 McAllister 1980, pp.79-92 
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system (AMS) used for Assembly elections and the broader dynamics of this new 
devolved context have made it easier for the other parties to compete and challenge 
Labour. In addition, the weak nature of Welsh media and the absence of the air war13 
present at UK General Elections have provided a greater onus and burden on the Welsh 
parties to get out their vote. Secondly, Welsh devolution has brought with it the need for 
parties to develop policies in a way that simply wasn’t required pre-devolution. This has 
therefore created a need for a sufficiently developed policy capacity amongst Welsh 
parties. Thirdly, the intellectual and electoral challenges outlined above, have therefore 
brought greater pressures on party organisation in Wales, in particular on resources 
and therefore the self-sufficiency of these bodies.14 
 
Devolution has, therefore, brought a new political context and new challenges for Welsh 
political parties, including Welsh Labour Party. This article will argue that on each of the 
points listed in the checklist above, Welsh Labour was found wanting during the first 
decade of devolution 1999-2009. At the heart of this failure will be the impact of 
hegemony on Welsh Labour’s organisation; locally, nationally and ideationally. 
 
Welsh Labour on the Ground 
 
Labour has dominated Welsh politics for a nearly a century, an electoral hegemony that 
as mentioned earlier has blurred the boundaries between the Welsh Labour Party and 
 
13 By air war, this article is referring to the role of the media during an election campaign, ranging from 
the format of Prime Ministerial debates or in the endorsement of a specific party by a newspaper.  
14 This checklist is informed by the challenges identified in Wyn Jones, R. and R Scully. (2008a). The End 
of One Partyism? Party Politics in Wales in the Second Decade of Devolution, Contemporary Wales, Vol. 21, 
University of Wales Press: Cardiff, pp. 211-214  
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Welsh political life, yet has at the same time paradoxically been a source of weakness 
within the party’s organisation. In particular, the electoral might of Welsh labour has 
acted as smokescreen for their organisational frailties, even in constituencies that have 
historically been their heartlands.15  
 
Welsh Labour’s membership figures in particular have been a long running sore, with 
the strenuous efforts made over the years by Welsh and London officials to boost 
membership regularly resulting in failure.16  For example, the national agent, A.L. 
Williams in 1952 noted that, “the national average per constituency party throughout 
the whole country is 1,426-in Wales it is only 1,110 and out of 36 constituencies 17 
have a membership of less than a 1,000.”17  The result was a situation that clearly fits 
McAllister’s thesis of electoral dominance disincentivising participation. Power in local 
parties in many areas of Wales was concentrated in the hands of “a small, but dedicated 
group of diligent individuals, agents or councillors.”18 These oligarchies were, according 
to McAllister, ruthlessly self-enforcing oligarchies, with their defining tendency a 
jealous guarding of power, often at the expense of building membership and 
participation levels.19   
 
Hegemony, however, also bred inertia, with little incentive for local parties in Labour 
heartlands to maintain effective and active organisations, resulting in further 
 
15 Morgan, K. (2000). Power and Glory: War and Reconstruction 1939-1951, in, Tanner, D. Williams, C. 
and D. Hopkin (eds.), The Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000, UWP:  Cardiff, 2000, p. 172; Walling, A.  
(2000). The Structure of Power in Labour Wales 1951-1964, in, Tanner, D., Williams, C. and D. Hopkin 
(eds.), The Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000, UWP:  Cardiff, pp. 203-204 
16 McAllister 1980, p.81  
17 Williams quoted in McAllister 1980, p.81 
18 Walling 2000, p.206 
19 McAllister 1980, p.81 
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stagnation.20 As Morgan and Mungham claim, it was often in the strongest electoral 
regions for Labour in Wales that their membership was weakest, a situation that by 
1963 had become so embarrassing for the party that they stopped publishing 
membership figures.21 Fortunately (or perhaps not), later surveys were still able to shed 
light on Welsh Labour’s membership failure, with the revelation that, if a 1977 survey 
was accurate, “only 12 per cent of Welsh CLPs had a membership exceeding the 
statutory minimum of 1,000 necessary to affiliate.”22   This decline of Welsh Labour’s 
membership and activism was widely perceived to have continued during the period 
1999-200923 as data from the 2010 leadership election starkly shows.24  According to 
these figures, the estimated number of Labour members in Wales is 11,160, a 
substantial decline for the Labour Party in Wales. 
 
20 Walling 2000, p. 212 
21 Morgan and Mungham 2000, p.75 
22 McAllister 1980, p.81 
23 Lewis, T. (2007). Winning for Wales: Remaking the Welsh Labour Movement for Government, Wales 
20:20, pp.7-10; Wyn Jones and Scully 2008a, p.212 
24 Labour Party. (2010a). Votes by CLP:  2010 Leadership Election, 
http://www2.labour.org.uk/leadership-clps (accessed: 7th October 2010)  















Of course, membership decline should not be considered an exclusively Welsh Labour 
phenomenon, indeed party membership in general has been falling in countries across 
the world.26 Yet this should not lead to the significance of these figures to be 
disregarded.  
 
This was not just because the 2010 estimates would see the worst membership figures 
on record for Welsh Labour since 1929, but because such decline came from what was 
historically considered a comparatively low base.27 Labour in Wales have traditionally 
fared worse in their members to votes ratio than in London and even the South East of 
England.28 Furthermore, so significant was the malaise in Welsh Labour membership, 
that if the 2010 estimates were accurate, no CLP would have met the old 1000 member 
minimum affiliation level mentioned earlier, a steep drop from a 1977 membership 
survey which suggested at least twelve percent of Welsh CLPs had at least a thousand 
members, and that forty seven percent had 750-1000 members.29 In 2010 it appeared 
that no Welsh CLPs could claim even 500 members. 
 
25 Data from Tanner, C., Williams, C. and D. Hopkin. (2000). Appendix III: Labour Party Membership 
Statistics 1928-1955, in, Tanner, D., Williams, C. and D. Hopkin (eds.), The Labour Party in Wales 1900-
2000, UWP:  Cardiff, 303; McAllister 1980, p.88; Labour Party 2010a [online] 
 
26 Whiteley, P. (2009). Is the Party Over?: The Decline of Party Activism and 
Membership across the Democratic World, PSA Paper, p. 28 
27 Tanner, D. (2000a). Facing the New Challenge: Labour and Politics 1970-2000, in Tanner, D., Williams, 
C. and D. Hopkin (eds.), The Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000, UWP:  Cardiff, p. 259 
28 P. Seyd and P. Whiteley. (1992). Labour’s Grassroots: The Politics of Party Membership, Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, pp.28-29 
29 Martin, C. and D. Martin. (1977). The Decline of Labour Party Membership, The Political Quarterly, 48 







However, membership decline was just one aspect of a broader organisational decline 
within Welsh Labour. As Jeff Jones, the former leader of Bridgend Council, wrote in the 
wake of their disappointing 2008 results (the party was left with overall control of just 
two councils):  
In many parts of Wales the party is a shell and has been for years. Party 
organisation is almost non-existent and campaigning often consists of pushing a 
leaflet through the door the week before the Election Day. Many councillors don’t 
hold surgeries, don’t issue newsletters and never appear in the local press... Welsh 
society is changing and has been for the last 30 years. It’s only the older generation 
who will vote Labour come hell and high water... very few young people are joining 
the party 30  
Even Cymdeithas Clewdyn, a short lived internal party group that sought to revive 
Welsh Labour in Y Fro31, endorsed this vision of Welsh Labour as an increasingly 
hollow, residual organisation in many parts of Wales, claiming that Welsh Labour Party 
in much of the “Fro” was plagued by low membership and was electorally unfit for 
purpose.32   With the detachment of CLPs from communities at the heart of both Jones’ 
and Cymdeithas Cledwyn’s critiques,33 hegemony, again appears to be prominent in 
 
30 Jones, J. (5th May 2008). Commenting on, Luke Akehurst, What happened in Wales?, Luke’s Blog, 
http://lukeakehurst.blogspot.com/2008/05/what-happened-in-wales.html (accessed 10th July 2010)  
31 While there is a lack of firm definition, “Y Fro”  is generally used in relation to the Welsh speaking 
heartlands of North West and Mid and West Wales (examples of its usage can be seen in: Aitchison, J. and 
H. Carter. (1991). Rural Wales and the Welsh Language, Rural History 2(1), pp.61-79; Balsom, D., 1985. 
The Three-Wales Model. In: Osmond, J. (Ed.), The National Question Again. Gomer, Llandysul). For the 
record Cymdeithas Cledwyn defined “Y Fro” as “the seats in the western half of Wales with a high 
proportion of Welsh speakers” (Cymdeithas Cledwyn. (2008). The Fro: Winning votes in Welsh-speaking 
Wales, Cymdeithas Cledwyn, p. 6).    
32 Cymdeithas Cledwyn 2008, p.14 
33 Jones May 5th 2008 [online]; Cymdeithas Cledwyn 2008, p. 14 
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explaining this disjuncture, through the earlier mentioned traditional oligarchical and 
insular mindset that dominated many CLPs.34  
 
In particular, while Labour in Y Fro lacked the same foundations and pre-eminence 
than in the party’s Valleys bastions, Cymdeithas Cledwyn suggested that a similar 
pattern of detachment and decline had developed there.35 The report noted, for 
example, the success of Plaid Cymru in sweeping aside a ‘shaky Labour establishment’ 
in North West Wales in the 1970s. Furthermore, it cited the example of Llanelli, in Mid 
and West Wales, as a CLP that, despite decades of electoral dominance at Parliamentary 
elections, was “living off past glories.”36   
 
It is worth noting that Welsh Labour’s difficulties were intensified by the impact of 
deindustrialisation.. Traditionally many CLPs relied upon Unions as a way to counter 
low membership and activism and remain grounded in their localities through the 
support structures and core bloc of support provided by union members in the heavy 
industries and to remain in touch with their localities.37 Deindustrialisation has 
therefore had a significant role in the state of organisational detachment between 
many Welsh CLPs and their local communities.38  
 
Despite the impact of deindustrialisation, it was once again complacency that appears to 
account for much of Welsh Labour’s weakness, historically and during the period 1999, 
 
34 Walling 2000, p.206; McAllister 1980, p.81 
35 Cymdeithas Cledwyn 2008, p.14 
36 As above 
37 Laffin, M., Taylor, G, and A. Thomas. (2004). Devolution and Party Organisation: The Case of the Wales 
Labour Party, Contemporary Wales, 16(4), p.4; McAllister 1980, p. 82 
38 Tanner 2000a, p. 83 
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2009. As the-now Welsh Labour Government Minister, Huw Lewis, noted in a Wales 20: 
20 Pamphlet in comments on the party’s heartlands:  
Rarely now do you hear ‘we’re all Labour here’ when you knock on a house with 
more than one generation living there-assumptions can no longer be made about 
‘Labour areas.39  
 
Such comments about the role of assumptions in Welsh Labour campaigning add 
credence to the hegemony hangover/complacency thesis, particularly when one also 
considers the words of a veteran Welsh Labour MP about the need (or absence of such) 
after the party’s 2007 performance: 
We held on in the marginals we lost before. We dropped votes where there were 
large majorities and it did not matter”40  
 
This je nais regrette rien attitude seems to be the very sort of assumption taking and 
complacency that Lewis acknowledges and warns against.41 Furthermore this shows just 
how salient McAllister’s thesis remained in the first decade of devolution, urgency only 
felt in marginals where the party’s stranglehold was less secure.42 Indeed, Peter Hain 
(ironically) made this precise argument in 2008 when he admitted that losing power 
locally in Bridgend forced the party to re-engage and campaign locally.43  
 
 
39 Lewis 2007, p. 7 
40 Email correspondence between anonymous MP and author 2011.  
41 Lewis 2007, p.7 
42 McAllister 1980, p.79 
43 Hain, P. (19th May 2008). Hain calls for radical changes within Welsh Labour, Western Mail,                                                                                        
http://www.[online].co.uk/news/welsh-politics/welsh-politics-news/2008/05/19/hain-calls-for-






One critical barometer of a party’s strength organisationally on the ground (intertwined 
with the issues of complacency, detachment and decline outlined above) is electoral 
mobilisation. This is something that is especially significant given the added emphasis 
placed on CLP’s organisational effectiveness by deindustrialisation, the media deficit 
and devolution in Wales. 
 
Welsh Labour traditionally relied upon heavy industry, not just for activists, expertise 
and infrastructural assistance via the Trades Unions, but for core blocs of electoral 
support.44 As the previous sections mentioned, the processes of deindustrialisation 
since the 1970s, and especially during the 1979-1997 Conservative administrations, 
were critical for Welsh Labour, decimating groups which had historically provided 
staunch support, and impacting directly on many CLPs which had historically depended 
on union support due to their low membership and activist levels.45   
 
44 Tanner 2000, pp. 266 and 283 











Alongside the impact of deindustrialisation we also have the issue of the nature of 
media coverage for devolved elections.  Unlike the Westminster ‘air war’, the small and 
dwindling Welsh media has resulted in voter mobilisation being far more dependent on 
and therefore reflective of local organisational capacities.47  As the graph above shows, 
there was a substantial gulf in Welsh Labour’s average share of the vote in Westminster 
and Assembly elections, indicating that, alongside the structural barriers to higher 
Assembly turnout placed by the fragile Welsh media, Welsh Labour’s mobilisational 
abilities leave much to be desired. As Osmond’s analysis of the 2007 election in Crossing 
the Rubicon shows, Welsh Labour’s vote fell in 39 out of 40 constituencies, with 11 of 
the 15 ultra-marginals (seats where the incumbent party’s majority is under 2,000) in 
2011 under Labour incumbency.48  
 
Part of the problem for Welsh Labour at Assembly elections was greater electoral 
competition, with devolution resulting in rivals, such as the Tories and especially Plaid, 
 
46 Data from Cymdeithas Cledwyn  2008, p.11 
47  Interview with a Welsh Labour MP 19th July 2010; interview with former Welsh Government Special 
Advisor and current Welsh Government Minister 24th September 2010 
48 Osmond, J. (2007). Crossing the Rubicon: Coalition Politics Welsh Style, IWA: Cardiff, 2007, pp.1-3 
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more palatable and relevant than they would be at the Westminster arena (Curtice 
2000:23 and Wyn Jones and Scully 2008a: 212-213). Added to this, during the first 
decade of devolution with Labour Government in Whitehall and in the Bay, the old 
Welsh Labour resource of proclaiming itself Wales’ national champion fighting against a 
Tory dominated UK political scene was rendered outdated and insufficient (Wyn Jones 
and Scully 2008a: 214-216). 
 
Furthermore the semi-proportional electoral system (AMS) used at Assembly elections 
made politics in Wales more competitive than it had been for over half a century, 
requiring Welsh Labour to not only make a more effective appeal to Welsh voters, but 
also boast a more effective electoral mobilising organisation (Wyn Jones and Scully 
2008b: 71 and a:212).  Instead, as even one senior Welsh Government Minister has 
admitted, Labour clung to a core vote strategy49 that may preach to the converted, but 
did little to broaden the party’s appeal.50 Unsurprisingly then, the electoral results of the 
period 1999-2009 were historically poor for Welsh Labour. Furthermore, the difficulty 
the party encountered in casting a new and more relevant appeal and the core vote 
strategy adopted in this period reflected not only a conservative mindset within the 
Labour Party in Wales, but a limited grassroots organisation.  Both of which were 
products of the intellectual and organisational malaise that had afflicted the party as a 
consequences of its hegemony.51  
 
 
49 Interview with former Welsh Government Special Advisor and current Welsh Government Minister 24th 
September 2010 
50 Wyn Jones and Scully 2008b, p.71 
51 Wyn Jones and Scully 2008a, pp.213-214 
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For example, while the disastrous results in heartland seats in 1999 were largely 
considered to be protests at Labour’s internal leadership machinations,52 the damage 
inflicted was compounded by the fact that the organisational malaise of many Welsh 
CLPs had rendered them organisationally unfit for mobilising voters or to effectively 
defeat a strong challenger.53 Indeed, the rise of the Liberal Democrats in Merthyr Tydfil 
and Rhymney between 2005 and 2010, was seen by one local correspondent as a 
consequence of an ineffectual CLP being out-muscled by a spirited local Liberal 
Democrat organisation and in particular the local Liberal Democrat candidate at 
Westminster and Assembly elections, Amy Kitcher.54   
 
To finish this point on electoral mobilisation and the hegemony hangover in this area, it 
is worth noting that where Labour has bucked the trend in recent years and got its vote 
out was most noticeably been in areas that where defeats had shaken CLPs into actions, 
for example the earlier mentioned Bridgend case (where the loss of the council in 2004 
led the party to achieve one of the few good results for Labour in 2008 by re-engaging 
and local campaigning) and in the Rhondda where the CLP  veered from the disaster of 
witnessing Plaid winning the seat in 1999, to becoming the third largest CLP in Wales 
and the largest outside of Cardiff.55 This volte-face in electoral and organizational 
fortunes has been further confirmed by the fact that Rhondda Cynon Taff was just one of 
the two councils Labour controls outright in Wales after the 2008 council elections. 
 
 
52 Broughton, D. (2002).  A New Welsh Electoral Profile?: the Welsh voters at the polls 1997-1999, Welsh 
Governance Centre Paper, 15 
53 Tanner 2000a, p.293 
54 Elniff-Larsen, A. (12th June 2010). If it’s Merthyr, is it still Labour?, Click-on- Wales: The Institute of 
Welsh Affairs, http://www.clickonwales.org/2010/06/if-it%E2%80%99s-merthyr-is-it-still-labour/ 
(accessed 28th July 2010) 
55 Labour Party 2010a [Online]  
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Welsh Labour in Central Office  
 
Another prime example of Welsh Labour’s organisational underdevelopment in this 
period can be found by looking at the Party in Central Office. Despite already being 
established during the 1920s and 30s as the dominant political force in Wales, it took 
until 1947 for a Welsh Labour organisation to even exist.56 Prior to this, separate 
organisations had existed in the North and South of Wales. However, the dominant of 
those two, the South Wales Regional Council of Labour had itself only been established 
in 1937, and then arguably only because of the challenge from the Communist party in 
the Rhondda.57 Similarly the party’s organisational modernisation in the 1960s can be 
seen primarily as a forced development, with the rise of Plaid Cymru, in particular its 
victory in Carmarthen in 1966 and its creditable performances in South Wales by-
elections in Rhondda West (1967) and Caerphilly (1968), acting as a catalyst for Labour 
to adopt internal organisational reform.58  
The culture of lethargy within the party can also be seen in the party’s reliance upon 
individuals to drive its organisation, for example the Welsh Party’s leadership and the 
role of Emrys Jones in the 1960s in building a more assertive Labour Party in Wales.59 
When Jones retired in the late 1970s, however, “the party organisation reverted to type 
and became a pedestrian branch-office once again,”60 an indictment of the lethargic 
internal culture that will become more familiar to us throughout the rest of this article. 
 
56 Morgan and Mungham 2000, p.89 
57 As above, p.72 
58 For the full details of Labour’s organisational modernisation in the 1960s see Tanner, D. (2000). Facing 
the New Challenge: Labour and Politics 1970-2000, in Tanner, D., C. Williams and D. Hopkin (Eds.), The 
Labour Party in Wales 1900-2000, UWP: Cardiff, pp.264-293 
59 Morgan and Mungham 2000, p.91 




Self-sufficiency, Autonomy, Professionalism  
 
If devolution has raised serious questions about Welsh Labour’s organisation, most 
noticeably about the extent to which it is a substantively autonomous and effective 
organisation, answers will only be found by understanding the dynamics of the Welsh 
Labour’s relationship with the party at the UK level.  
Wales has long been treated as a regional branch of the national party, with the central 
party historically reluctant to promote regional distinctiveness and often accused by the 
Welsh party of neglect.61 The success of Labour in Wales has, therefore, arguably 
created a culture of complacency, not just in Wales, but also in London, with little effort 
from London to help the party in Wales develop. This centralist outlook is at the heart of 
the complex relationship between the party in Wales and the National HQ in London, 
one in which centralism and complacency have often walked hand in hand, at the 
expense of an efficient Welsh organisation.62  
 
The role of candidate selection displays these inter-organisational dynamics, whilst 
formally autonomous over candidate selection, Welsh Labour’s selection procedures are 
importantly shaped by guidelines set down by the National Executive Committee in 
London.63 This interplay between centre and periphery came to the fore in the twinning 
procedure used for the 1999 Assembly elections, while there was considerable Welsh 
 
61 As above, pp. 92, 175 and 178 
62 Morgan and Mungham 2000, p.92 
63 Labour Party. (2010b). The Labour Party Rulebook 2010, p. 29; Russell, M., Mackay, F. and L. McAllister. 
(2002). Women's Representation in the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales: Party 
Dynamics for Achieving Critical Mass, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 8 (2), p. 69 
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agency involved, in the form of figures such the two female MEPs (Glenys Kinnock and 
Eluned Morgan), Anita Gale etc., the adoption of twinning was heavily influenced by the 
UK Party.64  
 
In particular, as Jones has emphasized, the UK Labour Party was determined to drive 
through the policy as part of Blair’s modernisation agenda,65 a resolve that manifested 
itself in the private and public lobbying efforts of the then UK Labour General Secretary, 
Tom Sawyers, and figures such as John Prescott, most notably through their appearance 
at 1998 Welsh Labour Conference ‘entrusted’ to approve the policy.66   
 
So whilst it was the Welsh Party that formally adopted twinning, the agenda and 
framework were established by the UK Labour Party and NEC,67 highlighting the 
centre’s reluctance to cede full responsibility to the Welsh Labour Party and thus 
helping to stunt its development as an autonomous organisation.  
More evidence of these dynamics and their organisational consequences for Welsh 
Labour is found in the field of policymaking. Arguably this is where Welsh Labour has 
been considered to be most distinctive from the UK Party, specifically through the Clear 
Red Water agenda.68 This saw PFI initiatives rejected in Wales, alongside the abolition 
of prescription charges, putting down a clear marker between Welsh Labour and the 
 
64 Russell et al. 2002, p.58 
65 Jones, J B (2000) Labour Pains, in Jones, J. B. and Balsom, D. (eds.) The Road to the National Assembly 
for Wales, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, p. 201 
66 Russell et al. 2002, pp.58-59; Jones 2000, p.201 
67 Russell et al. 2002, p. 69; Bradbury, J., Bennie, L., Denver, D. and J.Mitchell. (2000). Devolution, Parties 
and New Politics: Candidate Selection for the 1999 National Assembly Elections, Contemporary Wales, Vol 
13, p. 161 
68 Taylor, G. (2003). Labour, in, Osmond, J. and J. B. Jones. (eds.), Birth of Welsh Democracy: The First Term 




marketization and managerialism of New Labour.69 However, even here there were 
definite boundaries for Welsh Labour as despite this apparent policy autonomy in 
Wales, as one figure heavily involved in Welsh Labour policy claims Welsh Labour’s 
policy agenda was, in effect, limited by party management concerns; namely avoiding 
policies that would be reported as attacks on New Labour.70  
 
All these cases reflect the significant contribution made by the central party relations in 
undermining Welsh Labour’s autonomy and development.  A lack of development that 
can be summed up by the fact that despite devolution, this period saw no de jure 
separate leader of Welsh Labour (although the Leader of the Assembly Labour Team is 
de-facto leader of the Welsh party), no separate formalised existence for Welsh Labour 
or even long term registration as a separate accounting unit with the Electoral 
Commission (although it was registered briefly) and the continued sole accountability 
of Welsh Labour staff to the NEC in London.71  
 
Once again it appears that hegemony has bred a damaging complacency for Welsh 
Labour, albeit this time in terms of the UK Party’s attitudes towards the Welsh 
organisation. The most damning indictment of the central party’s attitudes comes from 
one party official who, allegedly, claimed that Wales was a, “safe and sleepy political 
backwater, so it didn’t matter about the calibre of the party’s staff.”72 Welsh Labour’s 
dominance, from this perspective, would appear to have resulted in officials within the 
 
69 See above 
70 Interview with former Welsh Government Special Advisor and current Welsh Government Minister 24th 
September 2010 
71 Morgan and Mungham 2000, p.92 
72 Anonymous Party Official quoted in Morgan and Mungham 2000, p. 92 
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central party taking future success for granted (crucially echoing the sentiments 
expressed earlier by the anonymous MP that corresponded with the author via email), 
with little incentive to facilitate organisational development of the party in Wales. 
 
Certainly, the Welsh Labour Party has never been a self-sufficient organisation, with the 
party’s earlier mentioned reliance on unions replaced post-deindustrialisation by a 
dependency on handouts from the central party.73 With the party’s income, even in the 
period 1999-2009, entirely reliant upon the generosity and financial wellbeing of the 
party at London,74 it is unsurprising Lewis has argued that the consequence has been to 
handicap the organisational development of Welsh Labour and with resources provided 
on the Westminster, not Welsh, election cycle, resulting in a “boom and bust” approach 
to staffing, the party’s ability to compete effectively has been hindered.75  
 
This lack of self-sufficiency appears to have significant impacted on the party’s 
professionalism, which can be seen most starkly in the example of the 2007 election.  
Amidst a resource crunch and unhelpful funding cycles, Welsh Labour could only afford 
three full-time staff members in 2007 and were unable to fund the sort of campaigns 
essential to hold on in marginals.76 Indeed, the 2007 Assembly Election saw the party 
outspent in Wales for the first time, by Plaid Cymru, according to spending figures 
released by the Electoral Commission: 
 
73 Lewis 2007: 9-10 
74 Lewis 2007: 9-10 
75 As above 
76 Lewis 2007, pp. 6 and 9-10 and author’s interview with a Welsh Government Minister, 24th September 
2010 








Fundamentally the failure to build a self-sufficient party in Wales had serious 
consequences during the 1999-2009 years, with financial underdevelopment being 
starkly exposed in the light of the economic problems facing the party in London. 
Returning to 2007 where Welsh Labour suffered their worst result under devolution, 
this lack of self-sufficiency meant that whereas, as one senior Welsh Labour insider 
says, every bit of Plaid signage was “new and fresh for that election,” Labour was 
reduced to recycling old posters.78 With few resources to spare, the result was a 
campaign where volunteers dominated and a party of government had to rely on a 





77 Electoral Commission. (6th December 2007). New figures reveal spending by parties at Welsh Assembly 
elections, Electoral Commission Website, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/news-and-
media/news-releases/electoral-commission-media-centre/news-releases-campaigns/new-figures-
reveal-spending-by-parties-at-welsh-assembly-elections?SQ_DESIGN_NAME=search_clean (accessed 22nd 
February 2011). Despite being outspent by Plaid Cymru, Labour continued to poll more votes on both the 
constituency (32.2% to Plaid’s 22.4%) and regional list ballots (29.6% to 21%). Furthermore, it remained 
comfortably the single largest party in the National Assembly for Wales with 26 Assembly Members to 
Plaid’s 15.  
78 Interview with former Welsh Government Special Advisor and current Welsh Government Minister 24th 
September 2010 
79 Lewis 2007, pp. 9-10 and interview with former Welsh Government Special Advisor and current Welsh 
Government Minister 24th September 2010 
Labour Party 254,447 








The policy process within Welsh Labour in this decade revolved around two core 
institutions: the Welsh Policy Forum and the Welsh Joint Policy Committee, both of 
which were established as a result of the adoption of the Partnership in Power model, 
used by the UK Labour Party during this period, by Welsh Labour.80 The two bodies 
worked like this: 
 
Welsh Policy Forum (WPF)-based on the National Policy Forum at the UK level, this 
forum was driven by policy commissions and the Welsh Joint Policy Committee. The 
WPF oversaw the policy development process and consisted of representatives from 
CLPs and affiliated organisations. 
 
Welsh Joint Policy Committee (WJPC)-‘the effective policy making body of the party’ 
(Laffin et al. 2004:11), the WJPC was responsible for agreeing policy documents 
following consultation outside of the manifesto cycle (2003: 11). The WJPC’s 
membership consisted of the Chair of the WPF, three Vice Chairs (one from each of the 
following: Welsh PLP, NALP and WLGA Labour Group), four CLP representatives 
(elected by CLP representatives to WPF), four affiliated organizations representatives 
(elected by affiliated organization representatives to WPF), four Welsh Assembly 
Government Ministers (the First Minister and 3 others), the Secretary of State for Wales 
 
80 Lafffin et al. 2004, pp. 10-11 
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and the Wales Office Junior Minister, two WEC representatives and one National Policy 
Forum Wales Rep (elected by representatives to the NPF)81 
 
While the WPF formally provided wider representation for activists in policy making, it 
became a common complaint during the decade 1999-2009 that Welsh Labour’s policy 
mechanisms in reality favoured the party elite.82  In particular, significant policy control 
lies in the hands of party chiefs charged with writing the manifesto. Laffin et al. highlight 
the 2003 campaign, for example, where the 10 key Welsh Labour election pledges were 
not discussed by the WPF.83 Furthermore Lewis has argued that the policy process, 
while more open than in the past, is still in effect elite driven, to the detriment of party 
members and even MPs (2007: 20-23), highlighting the experience of the 2007 
manifesto process where the ‘radical set of priorities which were agreed (via the 
WPF)...were sadly lost in the final document’ (Lewis 2007: 20).   
 
Allegations of manifesto chiefs bypassing the policy process are, unsurprisingly, 
rejected by a senior figure involved in writing the 2003 and 2007 manifestos. Although 
his protestation that manifesto writers, ‘have to have some latitude to introduce some 
ideas at the final stage that are consistent with the rest of the manifesto, but may not have 
been through the same process’84 can be seen as an acknowledgement of the discretion 
 
81 Powys, B. (24th November 2009). No rush, lads, Betsan’s Blog-BBC Online, 24th November 2009, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/betsanpowys/2009/11/no_rush_lads.html (accessed 9th 
March 2011) 
82 Laffin et al. 2004, pp. 8 and 11-12; Lewis 2007, pp.20-21. However, it is important to acknowledge that 
this is a charge applicable to political parties across the United Kingdom (see for example: Bradbury and 
Laffin. (2006). British Statewide Parties and Multilevel Politics, Publius, pp.135-152 and Evans, E. and 
Sanderson-Nash, E. (2011) From sandals to suits: Professionalization, coalition and the Liberal 
Democrats. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13(4), pp. 459–473 
83 Lafffin et al. 2004, p.12 
84 Emphasis added interview with former Welsh Government Special Advisor and current Welsh 
Government Minister 24th September 2010 
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and power in the hands of the Welsh Labour elite, who are able to shape significant 
elements of the manifesto outside of the party’s democratic processes. 
 
For one figure interviewed this linked directly to their belief in the importance of key 
individuals within Welsh Labour. Speaking from personal experience about the 
adoption of the party’s policy on devolution (when he was a WEC member), he argued 
that the policy was driven through by a troika of Ron Davies, Rhodri Morgan and Peter 
Hain with the majority of activists willing to follow what these individuals decided.85 
The clear red water policy agenda can be seen as following in this elite-led policy 
tradition, according to this interviewee, with the policy resting on two key individuals; 




Centralisation has, perhaps infamously, also played an instrumental role in Welsh 
Labour’s selection process during this period. From the outset of devolution in 1999, 
the selection procedure came under considerable fire, with allegations that the party 
was freezing out ‘Old Labour’ candidates in favour of those who fitted the ‘New Labour’ 
bill.87 Furthermore, for those who were well connected, but had been unsuccessful, the 
appeals committee saw many such candidates rather dubiously approved on appeal.88  
 
 
85 Interview with Welsh political commentator and former WEC member, 31st August 2010 
86 See above 
87 Taylor 2003, pp.166-167 
88 Morgan and Mungham 2000, pp.154-156 
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Indeed Alun Michael was a fine example of a candidate being imposed as a result of their 
status.89 As Jones documents, Michael’s position as the lead candidate on the Mid and 
West Wales list was fiercely resisted by many local Labour members, with the Welsh 
Executive having to centrally impose him.90 Certainly while the framework for 
candidate selection procedures had been considerably shaped and coordinated by the 
centre at NEC level,91 the autonomy that did exist appears to have been used by the 
Welsh party elite, in that instance, to privilege the well connected.92 
 
The centralising tendencies of Welsh Labour elites were also apparent in the 2003 
selection, through the use of all-women shortlists. The party chose to adopt these 
shortlists for half of the most winnable seats and when no local party voluntarily 
adopted them, the Welsh party made the final choices of affected seats.93 For Laffin et al, 
the effects of elite control have been clear; they have further undermined active 
participation within the party by reducing the influence (and as such a key pillar of the 
incentive structure) of activists, thus further exacerbating the membership and 
organisational problems facing Welsh Labour.94  
 
B) Complacency  
 
Having already discussed the impact of what we’ve described as a ‘hegemony hangover’ 
on the party on the ground, it is not surprising that nationally, Welsh Labour can be 
 
89 Jones 2000, p.209 
90 See above 
91 Bradbury et al 2000, p,161; Russell et al 2002, p.69 
92 Morgan and Mungham 2000: 154-156 
93 Russell et al 2002, pp.73-74 
94 Laffin et al. 2004, p.14 
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seen to have suffered from a culture of complacency during the first decade of 
devolution.95 This culture can be seen most evidently in terms of what McAllister called 
a state of organisational conservatism, with an unwillingness to critically assess the 
party’s internal failings.96 As briefly mentioned earlier, the staggered (and limited) 
development of the Labour Party in Wales has largely been driven not by free choice, 
but by external shocks. It appears, therefore, that the party’s electoral dominance, 
especially in heartland seats, has resulted in what Wyn Jones calls a ‘sense of 
entitlement,’ in particular that the Welsh electorate will continue to support them, 
almost unconditionally.97 
 
The tone of Huw Lewis’ pamphlets and articles following the 2007 election, certainly 
suggests there are good grounds for such a critique. His warnings of potential defeats 
and indeed the danger of a ‘sleepwalk to a very real loss,’ are damning indictments of a 
party culture of complacency and lethargy,98 with Welsh Labour accused of being in 
denial about the new dynamics of devolved politics.99  
 
Indeed, one prime example of this reticence to critically analyse the party’s internal 
failings can be seen in the wake of the 1999 election, tellingly many in the party chose 
‘conveniently’ to blame the way in which Alun Michael had been selected, rather than 
address the party in Wales’ problems.100 Indeed, following the 2009  European election 
 
95 Wyn Jones, R. (9th June 2009). Quoted in Shipton, M. ‘We are now fighting for the very existence of 
Welsh Labour,’ Western Mail [online], http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/we-now-
fighting-very-existence-2099028 (accessed: 1st January 2010) 
96 McAllister 1980, p.87 
97 Wyn Jones quoted in Shipton 9th June 2009 [online] 
98 Lewis 2007, pp.6 and 11 
99 Wyn  Jones and Scully 2008, pp.76-77 
100 Lafffin et al. 2004, p.5 
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results (where Labour were beaten by the Conservatives for the first time), the party 
leadership again sought to use external factors as excuses for electoral decline, rather 
than look at what is wrong with Welsh Labour itself.101  Perhaps even more damning, 
the few attempts at injecting intellectual rigour into Welsh Labour, the Wales 20:20 and 
Cymdeithas Cledwyn think tanks, both appeared to have been consigned to oblivion. 
Little wonder, then, that the Western Mail responded to a party report calling for 
reform, to bemoan the lack of intellectual life within the party nationally in Wales.102 
 
The Party on Paper: Welsh Labour and Policy 
 
As this article has argued, electoral hegemony has significant organisational 
consequences for the dominant party. It should be little wonder then, that alongside 
organisational withering, One Partyism in Wales arguably resulted in an intellectual 
malaise within Welsh Labour.103  This intellectual withering is emphasized by Davies 
and Williams, who have argued that electoral dominance has resulted in increasing 
levels of conservatism in Welsh Labour, with those in power preoccupied with 
entrenching the status quo.104 Such a picture of an increasingly visionless, conservative 
organisation echoes Gwyn Alf Williams’ claim that Welsh Labour had descended into an 
oligarchical, career driven organisation and McAllister’s argument that hegemony 
breeds organisational conservatism.105  
 
101 Shipton June 9th 2009 [online] 
102 Western Mail Editorial, (27th June 2008). Comment: Labour has a general, not just a local problem, 
Western Mail, p.18 
103 Wyn Jones and Scully 2008a, p.214 
104 Davies, N. and D.Williams. (2009). Clear Red Water: Welsh Devolution and Socialist Politics, Francis 
Boutle: London, p.34 




Certainly this intellectual deficit appears evident in Welsh Labour’s policy process and 
policies during the first decade of devolution.  In particular, this hegemony hangover 
could be seen directly in terms of policy capability. With both the level of preparation 
made for devolution policy-wise by Welsh Labour and the resulting policies reserved 
for substantial criticism by one leading commentator on Welsh affairs, who is also well 
versed in Welsh Labour’s internal politics, for being so inadequate that it became one of 
the party’s “key weaknesses” during the first decade of devolution.106 
  
This lack of preparation forms part of what this political commentator and former WEC 
member has described as a weak intellectual period for the party in Wales, something 
that is particularly evident in the party’s manifestos during these years, with the 1999 
manifesto, in particular, highlighted as being neither substantive nor imaginative.107  
Even Welsh Labour’s keynote Clear Red Water strategy led to accusations that Welsh 
Labour lacked radicalism and being underequipped policy wise, with an alleged reliance 
on ‘distributing cash, rather than distributing ideas.’108  
 
Certainly this picture of unimaginative Welsh Labour policies is further captured by 
Holtham’s analysis of the Welsh Assembly’s record on public services.109  His argument 
 
106 Interview with Welsh political commentator and former WEC member, 31st August 2010 
107 Interview with Welsh political commentator and former WEC member, 31st August 2010 
108 Osmond, J. (2004), in A.Trench (Ed.), Has Devolution Made a Difference? State of the Nations 2004, 
Imprint Academic: London, 43 p.53; interview with Welsh political commentator and former WEC 
member, 31st August 2010 
109 Holtham, H. (18th February 2011). Public Services in Wales, Western Mail [online], 
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/business-in-wales/columnists/gerry-holtham/2011/02/18/gerry-




that there has been a tendency to take what he calls “the soft options” during the first 
decade of devolution led him to raise questions about a culture of complacency and 
inadequacy and as such can be seen as a clear criticism of Welsh Labour due to their 
position as the only party to have been permanently in the devolved Government, either 
alone (briefly between 1999-2000 and again between 2003-2007) or as the lead 
coalition partner, in the first decade of devolution. 
 
Aside from intellectual abeyance, hegemony’s impact is also seen in the highly 
centralised policy process in the Welsh party (as was detailed earlier). The policy 
process in Welsh Labour could be seen as highly oligarchical, with one senior figure 
involved in Welsh politics emphasising the power of key individuals in shaping the 
direction of the party.110 Something that should perhaps be unsurprising given that a 
dependence on key individuals has been a constant theme throughout Welsh Labour’s 
history, whether it was the role of Morgan and Drakeford in shaping Clear Red Water or 
Ron Davies and Peter Hain in moving Welsh Labour behind devolution in the early to 
mid-nineties.111 
  
However, rather than just a simple dependency on key individuals, the power of the 
party elite was further strengthened by significantly centralised policy mechanisms.112 
As we argued earlier, Welsh Labour’s policy process post-Devolution has arguably 
resulted in manifesto chiefs being empowered at the expense of the party rank and file, 
who have allegedly have been overridden and sidelined.113   Little wonder then, that 
 
110 Interview with Welsh political commentator and former WEC member, 31st August 2010 
111 Interview with Welsh political commentator and former WEC member, 31st August 2010; Morgan and 
Mungham 2000, p.91 
112 Lafffin et al. 2004, pp.8 and 11-12 
113 Lewis 2007: 20-21 
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Osmond argues that on the policy front, Welsh Labour has been defined by the 
importance of the party’s elite rather than the grass roots.114 As Laffin et al note, the 
result has been to further surround power at the centre, part of what they identify as an 
elite led process of marginalisation, with activists feeling little incentive to engage in 
this top-down dominated process.115 
 
During the first decade of devolution it appears that Welsh Labour has suffered from 
what President Bush Senior famously called the ‘the vision thing’ or what has been more 
critically described as an “intellectual atrophy.”116 An intellectual malaise that, once 
again, appears to be deeply rooted in the party’s hegemonic past, through the dynamics 





Whilst the formation of the Coalition Government in 2010 has enabled Welsh Labour to 
rebound rapidly from their poor results in 2007, with a strong performance in 2011, 
albeit not winning a majority, and at the 2012 council elections, this should not lead us, 
or the Welsh Labour party, to forget the very real failings both organisationally and 
ideationally evident during the first decade of devolution. Devolution has quite clearly 
created a far more challenging environment for Welsh Labour. The use of a semi-
proportional electoral system and the different electoral context has made it easier for 
 
114 Osmond 2004, p.53 
115 Lafffin et al. 2004, p.14 
116 Wyn Jones and Scully 2008a, p.214 
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rival parties to compete and to be counted in terms of representation. In the first decade 
of devolution these demands exposed the intellectual, organisational withering of Welsh 
Labour, a malaise that was deeply rooted in the party’s historic dominance. 
 
 During the period 1999-2009, the results of such exposure were unsurprising, with 
Welsh Labour’s electoral performance, particularly in the devolved arena, at historically 
low levels,117 coming a hitherto unthinkable second to the Conservatives in the 2009 
European Elections and after 2007 finding eight previously considered safe seats 
reduced to marginals.118  Welsh Labour’s poor response to the challenges posed by 
devolution between 1999-2009 was, this article argues, a result of a “hegemony 
hangover,” the symptoms of which were organisational and intellectual 
underdevelopment. Ill-equipped for devolution, in this period Welsh Labour in this 
period truly were an analogue party in a digital age.  
 
Appendix: 2010 Labour Leadership Election Welsh CLP data 
Aberavon CLP 367 
Aberconwy CLP 168 
Alyn and Deeside CLP 305 
Arfon CLP 154 
Blaenau Gwent CLP 310 
Brecon and Radnorshire CLP 220 
Bridgend CLP 288 
 
117 Cymdeithas Cledwyn 2000, p.11 and Osmond 2007, pp.1-3 
118 Balsom, D. (2005), The Wales Yearbook 2006, Francis Balsom Associates: Aberystwyth, pp.43-160; 
Osmond 2007, p.2 
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Caerphilly CLP 315 
Cardiff Central CLP 324 
Cardiff North CLP 408 
Cardiff South and Penarth CLP 375 
Cardiff West CLP 454 
Carmarthen East and Dinefwr CLP 203 
Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire CLP 207 
Ceredigion CLP 146 
Clwyd South CLP 252 
Clwyd West CLP 161 
Cynon Valley CLP 309 
Delyn CLP 269 
Dwyfor Meirionnydd CLP 89 
Gower CLP 383 
Islwyn CLP 275 
Llanelli CLP 276 
Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney CLP 317 
Monmouth CLP 329 
Montgomeryshire CLP 86 
Neath CLP 391 
Newport East CLP 250 
Newport West CLP 346 
Ogmore CLP 359 
Pontypridd CLP 333 
Preseli Pembrokeshire CLP 188 
Rhondda CLP 404 
Swansea East CLP 212 
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Swansea West CLP 325 
Torfaen CLP 359 
Vale of Clwyd CLP 261 
Vale of Glamorgan CLP 373 
Wrexham CLP 209 
Ynys Mon CLP 160 
    
Total membership 11160 
(Taken from Labour Party 2010a [online]) 
 
 
 
 
 
